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attractive ideas of the Taliban
vs. real men with guns

With two years in Pakistan before his deportation, award-winning alumnus author
explains the realities of fighting the taliban InTervIeW By coLLeen dIxon

F

Q&a

Freelance writer nicholas schmidle (’01) writes about cultural, political, religious and security issues facing the developing world. He arrived in Pakistan in 2006 on a writing
fellowship from the institute of Current world affairs in
washington, d.C. For two years schmidle lived in and
reported on Pakistan before being deported in 2008. He received the
2008 Kurt schork award for freelance journalism based on his work
in afghanistan and Pakistan.
schmidle is the author of To Live or To Perish Forever: Two
Tumultuous Years Inside Pakistan and is a fellow at the new america
Foundation. He regularly contributes to The New York Times Magazine, Slate, The New Republic, The Washington Post, The Virginia
Quarterly Review, Smithsonian and other publications.
Based on his expertise in Pakistan and afghanistan, schmidle
responded to questions on current events in that part of the world.
His answers also include links to a variety of recent articles he has
written about this region.

Madison: will the resurgent taliban continue to increase its influence in Pakistan and afghanistan? wasn’t the leader of the Pakistani
taliban recently killed?

Published
by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2010
P h o t o g r a P h c o u r t e s y o f n i c h o l a s s c h m i d l e (‘ 0 1)

Schmidle: does Baitullah Before being deported for reportinside prohibited regions
Mehsud’s death mean the ing
under Taliban control, journalist
end of the Pakistani tal- Nicholas Schmidle (’01) lived
iban? not by a long shot. in Pakistan for two years on
writing fellowship from the
the taliban are a regen- aInstitute
of Current World
erative militia; historically, the death Affairs in Washington, D.C. He
of one taliban member has only has also traveled in Afghanistan
and writes extensively about the
spurred others to avenge the fallen region. (Above): Schmidle talks
one’s death. several commanders are to children outside the Great
waiting to take over from Mehsud, Mosque in Herat, Afghanistan.
including Qari Hussain, Mehsud’s ruthless deputy, who is thought to
be most responsible for training suicide bombers. whether Hussain or
another lieutenant takes over, they’ll be hoping to strike back.
now the hard part begins. since the Cia has demonstrated its ability to pinpoint “high-level targets,” it will want to go after other top
taliban leaders in Pakistan, such as Maulvi nazir in south waziristan
and Jalaluddin Haqqani in north waziristan. But Pakistan’s military and security establishment perceives both men, who focus their
fighting in afghanistan and not in Pakistan, as national security assets
more than threats. and there’s no magic drone strike to fix that.
i go in depth on this topic in my aug. 7, 2009, article published by
w i n t e r
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Slate magazine. read “after Mehsud: the
rest of the Pakistani taliban won’t be such
easy targets” at www.slate.com/id/2224668.

Madison: How is taliban leadership
changing in the borderlands of Pakistan?
Schmidle: in the past five years, the taliban
has killed more than 150 pro-government
maliks, or tribal elders. oftentimes, the taliban would dump the bodies by the side of the
road for passers-by to see, with a note, written
in Pashto, pinned to the corpse’s chest, damning the dead man as an american spy.
while in Pakistan, i got to meet one of its
most influential politicians Maulana Fazlur
rehman. “when the jihad in afghanistan
started,” rehman told me, “the maliks and
the old tribal system in afghanistan ended; a
new leadership arose, based on jihad. similar
is the case here in the tribal areas. the old
tribal system is being relegated to the background and a new leadership, composed of
these young militants, has emerged.” He
added, “this is something natural.”
though rehman describes the emergence
of the local taliban in evolutionary terms,
he explains it as a result of a leadership crisis
in Pakistan. He respects the secular-minded
people who created Pakistan but insists that
social and religious changes over the past two
decades have made such leaders much less
relevant: “we have to adjust to reality, and
that demands new leaders with new visions.”
i asked if he considered himself such a
new leader with a new vision.
“i don’t consider myself as someone
extraordinary,” rehman replied. “i have the
same feelings as everyone else in the current
age: if the weather is warm, everyone feels
warm; if it is cold, everyone feels cold. the
difference between me and other people is in
our responsibilities.” He took a long breath
of the fresh, fall air, continued rubbing his
prayer beads and leaned over the chair to

even more online
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jmu.edu/bethechange/global_affairs.shtml.
n read student papers from the JMU international Undergraduate research Conference
on Conflict transformation, which brought
together students, professors and mentors
from around the world. download student
papers at www.jmu.edu/commstudies/conflict
analysis/draftPapers.shtml.
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spit. “that’s why i am so careful, because my
decisions can affect many, many people. i
am trying to bring people back from the fire,
not push them toward it.” rehman once
seemed ready to introduce taliban-style rule
in Pakistan. now he is trying to preserve
democracy from being destroyed by ruthless
militants. if he can’t succeed, can anyone?
i got more in depth with Maulana

‘any leader who resolves
to bomb the Taliban into
submission will be discredited domestically as
an american stooge.’
Fazlur rehman in a New York Times interview at www.nytimes.com/2008/01/06/
magazine/06PaKistan-t.html?pagewanted=7.

Madison: Could you explain the relationship between the american and Pakistani
governments, and how the latter’s commitment to fighting the taliban plays into that?
Schmidle: Pakistani leaders know that

nothing pleases the americans, or keeps
their dollars coming, like a dose of antitaliban realism. the Bush administration
gave Musharraf more than $10 billion for
help in the war on terrorism. the obama
administration has called for billions more,
albeit spread more evenly among economic
and civilian institutions than Bush-era funds.
Yet herein lies the fundamental quandary
of the U.s.-Pakistan alliance: any leader who
resolves to bomb the taliban into submission
will be discredited domestically as an american stooge. and no Pakistani politician can
lead a counterinsurgency against the taliban
without popular support. if the experiences of
Musharraf, Bhutto and zardari over the past
eight years are any indication, sharif’s very
willingness to play ball with the americans
could undo the support he’s amassed. Perhaps
the very fact that we’re starting to feel comfortable with him should make us nervous.
read more in my New Republic article,
“Can we trust nawaz sharif?” at www.tnr.
com/article/back-pak.
Madison: where do you see Pakistan heading in the next decade?

Schmidle: Pakistan is embroiled in at least
two major battles. one features helicopters,

https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/madisonmagazine/vol33/iss1/10
20
M a d i s o n M ag a z i n e — o n L i n e e x t r a

unmanned drones and artillery in the mountains of swat and the tribal areas. the other
involves tens of millions of Pakistanis around
the country, working within the context that
has determined their lives for so long and trying to reconcile what are seen as the attractive
ideas of the taliban with the not-so-appealing realities of the actual men with the guns.
Pakistani and U.s. governments are central to both conflicts. tactical and operational victories, such as the drone attack that
killed Baitullah Mehsud or the operation to
clear the swat Valley of militants, can only
be sustained if the appeal of the taliban is
diminished. the obama administration can
assist by channeling its aid away from purely
military support and building the capacity
of rural courts and police forces in villages
like Bangla acha. when the “rule of law”
rests on the whim of one feudal lord, as in
the case of someone like Mazari, extremists
can more easily offer a simplified, uniform
alternative — sharia law — and inject their
demands into the public debate.
i invite alumni who are more interested
about my two years in Pakistan to read my
article, “talibanistan: the talibs at Home,”
published in the fall 2009 issue of World
Affairs: a Journal of Ideas and Debate at www.
worldaffairsjournal.org/2009%20-%20Fall/
full-schmidle-Fall-2009.html.

Madison: if sharia law is the “uniform alternative,” justice should not be subject to the
whim of a tribal leader, correct? so, is there
another piece? are tribal leaders just as ruthless as the taliban and thus it’s a wash?
Schmidle: it’s true that there are two judi-

cial systems that co-exist today in the region
straddling the Pakistan-afghanistan border:
the Pashtun tribal system, known as Pashtunwali, and sharia or islamic law. Historically, tribal laws have also superseded islamic
ones in Pashtun culture. But over the past
few decades — following the anti-soviet
jihad in afghanistan and during the 1980s
and the rise of the taliban during the 1990s
— that’s begun to change. tribal law, in
and of itself, like islamic law, in and of itself,
isn’t necessarily ruthless. there may be some
tribal leaders who interpret aspects of Pashtunwalin in a way that could be seen as ruthless, just as the taliban have taken aspects of
islamic law to the extreme.
Learn more about schmidle at www.
nicholasschmidle.com/, and read more about
his book, To Live or to Perish Forever: Two
Tumultuous Years in Pakistan, in the Mixed
M
Media section of this magazine.
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